Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 37
Number 2 Symposium: The Emerging
Transnational Constitution

Article 8

11-1-2003

Deference to the Majority: Why Isn't the Supreme Court Applying
the Reasoning of Atkins v. Virginia to Juveniles
Sharon Ongerth

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sharon Ongerth, Deference to the Majority: Why Isn't the Supreme Court Applying the Reasoning of Atkins
v. Virginia to Juveniles, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 483 (2003).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol37/iss2/8

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

DEFERENCE TO THE MAJORITY: WHY ISN'T
THE SUPREME COURT APPLYING THE
REASONING OF A TKINS V. VIRGINIA TO
JUVENILES?
I. INTRODUCTION

On June 20, 2002, the Supreme Court decided Atkins v.
Virginia,1 holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals is
"cruel and unusual punishment" and therefore directly violates the
Eighth Amendment.
This decision overruled the Court's 1989
ruling in Penry v. Lynaugh,3 which allowed the execution of
mentally retarded criminals.4 On the same day that the Court
decided Penry, it ruled on another death penalty case-Stanford v.
Kentucky.5 The Stanford ruling upheld the death penalty as used
against a different class of criminals-juvenile offenders between the
ages of sixteen and seventeen.6
The Atkins majority indicated that its decision had no bearing on
the Stanford decision.7 Yet two months later, three members of the
Atkins majority stated otherwise. In their dissent urging a stay of the
execution of Toronto Patterson, who was arrested for murdering
three people when he was seventeen years-old, Justices John Paul
Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, argued that it
was time to reconsider juvenile executions in light of the Atkins
ruling. 8
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 340.
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Id. at 321.
492 U.S. 361 (1989).

6. See id.
7. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 n.18.

8. See In re Patterson, 536 U.S. 984 (2002); see also Tony Mauro, High
CourtDenies HabeasPetition of Teen-Age Killer, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER
October 22, 2002, at 4.
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On October 21, 2002, the issue came before the Court once
again. Kevin Stanford (whose case produced the Stanford ruling)
filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to set aside his death sentence. 9
In a 5-4 decision, the Court denied the petition. 10 Justice Souter,
however, dissented and joined ranks with the three Justices who
dissented in Patterson. These actions demonstrated that the
sentiment regarding the juvenile death penalty might be evolving
among the Justices. 1' Nevertheless, a few months later the Court
once again denied a petition for certiorari on the same issue in12 a
similar case, with the split among the Justices remaining stagnant.
In addition, current events have fueled more fire for the debate.
Lee Boyd Malvo, one of the infamous suspected snipers, was only
seventeen years-old when he was arrested. 13 He was tried as an adult
in Virginia, one of the remaining states that imposes the death
penalty on offenders under the age of eighteen. 14 Malvo was
convicted, but rather than imposing a death sentence, the jury
sentenced him to life in prison without parole. His adult coconspirator, however, was sentenced to die for a separate sniper
killing.' 5 The jury in the Malvo case was fiercely divided-five
jurors favored the death penalty while seven others believed that
Malvo was too young to die. 16
In the most recent development, the Supreme Court signaled that
they were ready to once again review the propriety of the juvenile
death penalty when they granted certiorari in the case of Roper v.
Simmons on January 26, 2004.'1 Christopher Simmons was
sentenced to death for a murder that he committed at the age of
9. See Mauro, supra note 8.

10. See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002).
11. Id.
12. See Hain v. Mullin, 537 U.S. 1173 (2003).
13. In the fall of 2002, a wave of random sniper attacks terrorized the
northeast. About a dozen people were murdered and several others were
wounded. For more information regarding the sniper attacks, see
http://www.cnn.com/US/sniper/archive/index.html.
14. Jury Sharply Split in Sparing Sniper Malvo, CNN, Dec. 24, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/24/sprj.dcsp.malvo.trial/index.html.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-0633 (2004) availableat 2004 WL
110849. It should be noted that this development came just before this article
was sent to the "presses."
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seventeen, however, the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Simmons
death sentence in the wake of Atkins v. Virginia.I8 While some may
speculate that four justices who dissented in the denial of Stanford's
habeas petition now have a fifth justice on their side, the fact that the
Court is going to readdress the issue does not spell a certain victory
for opponents of the juvenile death penalty. It is also possible that
the pro-death penalty justices may use this opportunity to strengthen
their stance that the Atkins reasoning
should not be extended to the
19
penalty.
death
juvenile
issue of the
This Note addresses the inconsistency of the Court's death
penalty jurisprudence as applied to mentally retarded and juvenile
offenders and argues that the Court should extend its reasoning in
Atkins to juveniles. In particular, Part II of this Article traces the
history of the juvenile justice system as well as this country's death
penalty jurisprudence and its application to juvenile offenders. This
Section questions whether the "constitutionalization" of the juvenile
system may have back fired-by creating a more rigid procedural
process, the individual needs of juvenile offenders may have gotten
lost along the way.
Part III of this Article analyzes the Thompson, Stanford, and
Penry decisions while tracing the Court's evolving reasoning behind
the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied to juvenile and
mentally retarded defendants. Part IV of this Article dissects the
Atkins decision and discusses its applicability to juvenile offenders.
Specifically, Part IV. A. suggests that there actually may be a
consensus against juvenile executions among the states. Part IV. B.
20
addresses the additional factors on which the Court relied in Atkins

18 See Bill Mears, Supreme Court Will Revisit Execution of Teenage Killers,
CNN, Jan. 26, 2004, at http://

www.enn.com/2004/Law/01/26/scotus.death.penalty/index.html. [hereinafter
Mears]. The Missouri court reasoned that the ruling of Atkins, 536 U.S. 304
(2002), should extend to the execution of minors and thus the state's juvenile
death penalty is unconstitutional. Missouri officials subsequently appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court asking for the law to be upheld. Id.
19. See Tony Mauro, Supreme Court to Examine Validity of Teen
Executions, THE RECORDER, Jan. 27, 2004, at 1.
20. These additional factors are: 1) the attitude of the world community
against the death penalty for these specific classes; 2) diminished capacity of
these types of offenders; 3) the penological utility of applying the death

486
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and reasons that an application of these additional factors demands
outlawing the juvenile death penalty. The Article recognizes that the
Supreme Court will only apply these paramount factors after it
determines that a consensus against the juvenile death penalty exists
among the states.
Next, the Article argues that such a consensus does exist and
therefore the Court should outlaw the juvenile death penalty under
the reasoning of Atkins. In the alternative, the Article suggests that
even if a consensus does not exist, the Court's heavy reliance on the
state legislatures to act first against the juvenile death penalty is
inappropriate. The purpose of enumerating rights, such as the
protection against cruel and unusual punishment in the Constitution,
is to elevate certain fundamental rights above the reach of the
political process. 2 ' By deferring to the states on the issue of the
death penalty the Court has undermined the power of the Eighth
Amendment.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. The Development andDecline of the Juvenile JusticeSystem
Historically, juvenile offenders have been treated differently
from their adult counterparts. 22 Prior to the 1900's, children and
adults were tried in the same courts. However, children were treated
more compassionately than adults, typically receiving less severe
sentences.23 Children under the age of seven were generally exempt
from prosecution as it was believed that children of such a young age
could not form criminal intent 2 4
In 1899, the first formal juvenile justice court was created in
Illinois, and by 1925, all but two states had juvenile court
legislation.
Reformers behind the creation of the juvenile justice
system were "appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the

penalty to these groups; and 4) the necessity of a legislative consensus. See
infra text accompanying 197-232.
21. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
22.

See VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 4 (1987).

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in
jails with hardened criminals. 26
The resulting system was fundamentally different from other
American judicial infrastructures.27 The system was idealistically
"fashioned to work more like a social welfare agency than an
institution of justice., 28 Instead of reacting to violations of law, the
juvenile justice system attempted to intervene before serious
violations occurred.29 Juvenile courts focused on predicting the
future behavior of children rather than considering the evidence of
past criminal acts. 30 Rehabilitation and guidance were the primary
aims. 3 1 The noble intentions of this system however, resulted in
outrageous abuses. 32 Juveniles were essentially excluded from the
constitutional protections of criminal procedure.33 Courts were not
34
required to adhere to the due process standards of adult courts.
Rather, children were convicted of crimes without evidence of
guilt. 35 Additionally, they often lacked the assistance of lawyers and
did not have the chance to face their accusers.36
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Supreme Court
decided a series of cases that served to "constitutionalize" the
38
juvenile justice system.37 Decided in 1966, Kent v. United States
was the first Supreme Court case to directly consider juvenile justice

26. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
27. STREIB, supra note 22, at 4.
28. YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE

JUSTICE I (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter
YOUTH ON TRIAL].

at 4.
30. Id.
31. YOUTH ON TRIAL, supranote 28, at 1.
32. EDWARD HUMES, No MATTER How LOUD I SHOUT: A YEAR IN THE
LIFE OF JUVENILE COURT 25 (1996).
33. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (United States Supreme
Court granted habeas corpus petition to a delinquency commitment of six
years, where fifteen year old defendant allegedly made a lewd phone call to a
neighbor, and where juvenile defendant had not been given sufficient notice of
the allegations against him, nor been provided the assistance of counsel.).
34. See YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 28, at 1.
35. HUMES, supra note 32, at 25.
36. See id.
37. STREIB, supra note 22, at 5.
38. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
29. STREIB, supra note 22,
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issues. 3 9 Prior to this ruling, juvenile courts had broad discretion in
deciding whether to waive juvenile defendants into adult criminal
courts.
The holding in Kent placed a constitutional limit on that
discretion.4 1 Thus before a court could waive juvenile offenders into
criminal courts, minors were now entitled to a hearing and the
assistance of counsel.42 In making its ruling, the Kent Court
observed, "[t]here is evidence.., that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for
' 3
children. A
The year following Kent, the Supreme Court extended further
protections to child offenders, holding in In re Gault, that the
44
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause applied to minors.
Thus, the current standards were established-during juvenile
adjudications children are given the same rights that adults receive in
criminal proceedings: the right to counsel, the right to notice of
charges against them, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, the right to remain silent and not to testify against
oneself.45 The Court followed up with In re Winship,4 6 holding that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile proceedings is a
necessary element of due process required by Gault.47 However, in
1971 the Court ruled that the Constitution does not require trial by
jury in juvenile adjudications.48
Some argue that "constitutionalization" of juvenile justice
rebounds the system to the other extreme-rather than focusing on
the rehabilitation and welfare of children, the system is overly
39. See

id.; see History of Juvenile Death Penalty, at http://

www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/coordcouncil/cc_03.html

(last visited Sept. 21,

2002) [hereinafter History ofJuvenile Death Penalty].
40. History ofJuvenile Death Penalty,supra note 39.
41. See id.
42. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 554; see also STREIB, supra note 22, at 14;
Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution: Transferring Children
to Criminal Court in Capital Cases, 1996 WIs. L. REv. 447, 452 (1996)

(discussing the procedural safeguards for juveniles established in Kent).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
STREIB, supra note 22, at 14.
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Id. at 368.

48. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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focused on adversarial procedures and technicalities. 49 By providing
children with the same procedural safeguards as adults, the system
legitimizes giving children adult punishments.5 0 This concern was
presupposed by Justice Stewart in his dissent to Gault:
[M]any dedicated men and women have devoted their
professional lives to the enlightened task of bringing us out
of the dark world of Charles Dickens in meeting our
responsibilities to the child in our society ....[The Court
now] invite[s] a long step backwards into the nineteenth
century. In that era there were no juvenile proceedings, and
a child was tried in a conventional criminal court with all
the trappings of a conventional criminal trial. So it was that
a 12-year-old boy named James Guild was tried in New
Jersey for killing Catharine Beakes. A jury found him
guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to death.... The
sentence was executed. It was all very constitutional.51
B. America 's Death PenaltyJurisprudence
In order to understand the application of the death penalty to
juvenile offenders, it is necessary to first examine death penalty
jurisprudence in general.
Adopted in 1791, the Eighth Amendment provides, "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted. ' ,52
Like most clauses of the
Constitution, the words of this "Amendment are not precise, and...
their scope is not static. 53 A claim that punishment is excessive is
not judged by the standards that existed when the Eighth Amendment
was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail. 4 The
definition of what is cruel and unusual punishment is drawn from
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. 55
In other words, the cruel and unusual clause is
49. HUMES, supra note 32, at 78; see YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 26, at
128.
50. See YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 28, at 128.
51. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 79-80 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
53. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
54. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
55. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
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"progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice.""
The modem death penalty era began in 1972 with the Court's
landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia.5 7 Rather than declaring
the death penalty unconstitutional per se, the Court held that because
of current sentencing procedures and the risk that executions could
be inflicted in an "arbitrary and capricious manner," the death
penalty as then administered violated the Eighth Amendment. 58 The
Court's decision was set forth in a brief per curiam opinion and did
not provide an explanation for its ruling. 59 Although the majority
had not rejected the death penalty outright, it had not indicated under
what conditions it might be preserved.U As a result, Furman created
considerable confusion among the death penalty states. 61 For the
next few years executions were put on hold, but by 1976 at least
thirty-five states had revised their death penalty legislation in
response to Furman.62 That same year, the Court decided Gregg v.
Georgia,63 ruling "the punishment of death does not invariably
violate the Constitution, 64 and that the "concerns expressed in
Furman... can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that
the sentencing authority is given adequate information and
guidance. 65 Thus, the imposition of the death penalty resumed in
1977, when a Utah firing squad executed Gary Gilmore on January
17.66 He was the first person executed in the United States in almost
ten years.67
56. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
57. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
58. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 493-94 (7th ed. 2001).

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 494.
Id.

Id.

Id.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id. at 169.
Id. at 195.
Angel on Death Row: Chronology of Capital Punishment, 5
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY RESEARCHER, No. 9, March 10, 1995 available
at http:// www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/angel/timeline.html (last visited
Jan. 3, 2003).
67. Id.
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C. The History ofJuvenile Executions
America's first documented juvenile execution occurred in
1642, when sixteen year-old Thomas Graugner was executed in
Since then,
-Massachusetts for the crime of bestiality.68
approximately 365 juvenile offenders have been executed in the
United States. 69 Although 226 juveniles have been sentenced to
death in the "modem death penalty era" only twenty-two have
actually been executed (as of June 30, 2003).70 The age range of
juvenile offenders executed throughout American history varies from
those who committed crimes days before their eighteenth birthday to
ten year-olds. 7 ' It was not until 1988, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,
that the Supreme Court placed an age limit on executions--capital
offenders under the age of sixteen can no longer be executed.72
In Eddings v. Oklahoma,73 the Court first approached the
juvenile death penalty issue without explicitly considering the
constitutional implications of executing juvenile offenders. In this
case, the Court vacated a juvenile's death sentence holding that the
"chronological age of a minor" is a significant mitigating factor that
must be considered when imposing sentences. 74 Writing on behalf of
the majority, Justice Powell acknowledged:
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and to psychological damage. Our history is
replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors...
generally are less mature and responsible than adults.75
During the late 1980's and 1990's, the United States saw an
increase in juvenile crime.7 6 This was due in part to the fact that
68. STREIB, supra note 22, at 55.
69. Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences
and Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973-June 30 2003 at http:/

www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm

(last visited Sept. 27, 2003)

[hereinafter Streib Web Report].

70. Id.
71.

STREIB,

supra note 22, at 57.

72. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
73. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
74. Id. at 116.
75. Id. at 115-16.
76. Steven A. Drizin & Stephen K. Harper, Old Enough to Kill, Old
Enough to Die, SAN FRANcIsco CHRONICLE, Apr. 16, 2000 available at
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"[a]s crack cocaine hit the streets... adult gang leaders and drug
dealers recruited and armed youngsters in their battle to control the
lucrative drug trade., 77 The number of juveniles charged with
murder spiked, and in 1995 John Dilulio coined the term
"superpredator" and predicted that a new breed of "remorseless and
morally impoverished" juveniles would soon take over the streets of
America as the youth population increased.78 In reaction to this
increase in juvenile crime, almost every state in the nation changed
their juvenile laws. A variety of approaches to deal with this new
crime wave emerged, from waiving more juveniles into criminal
court, to increasing the severity of punishments, to reducing the
confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings. 79
Against this
backdrop, the Supreme Court finally addressed the constitutionality
of the juvenile death penalty head on. In 1987, the Court decided
Thompson v. Oklahoma, placing an age limit on executions-capital
offenders under the age of sixteen could no longer be executed. 0
Reasonable people may differ in their approach on how to treat
young criminals who commit violent crimes, but the bottom line is
that their age and level of maturity is a factor that cannot be glossed
over--"ignoring this factor entirely is like trying to ignore a very
large elephant that has wandered into the room."8
The current
application of the juvenile death penalty fails to adequately address
what should be the focal point-the age, maturity, and thus
culpability of the offender.
III. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY: THOMPSON,
STANFORD, AND PENRY

Over time, the Supreme Court has articulated that the central
question in an Eighth Amendment analysis is whether the practice is
66
"cruel and unusual"
in light of evolving standards of decency. 82 In
the late 1980's the Court closely examined the death penalty as
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/04/16/S
C52SUN.DTI.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 28, at 14.
80. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
81. YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 28, at 30.

82. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
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83
applied to juveniles and mentally retarded offenders-Thompson,
Stanford,84 and Penry85 are the product of that assessment.

A. Thompson v. Oklahoma
On January 23, 1983, fifteen year-old William Wayne
Thompson and three older accomplices savagely murdered
Thompson's former brother in law, Charles Keene. 86 The crime was
premeditated. 7 The motive (at least in part) was Keene's history of
physically abusing Thompson's sister.88 Keene was severely beaten
before he was shot twice by Thompson-once in the head and once
in the abdomen. 89 Thompson and his fellow accomplices chained
Keene to a concrete block and threw his body in the river, but not
before Thompson cut his throat, so "the fish could eat his body." 90
The Court tried fifteen year-old Thompson as an adult and
subsequently found him guilty of first degree murder and sentenced
him to death. 91 In 1987, Thompson's case came before the Supreme
Court. 92 In a plurality opinion with Justice O'Connor concurring, the
an offender who
Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to execute
93
sixteen.
of
age
the
under
while
crime
a
committed
1. The reasoning of the plurality-Justices Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun
In determining that executing offenders under the age of sixteen
was unconstitutional in light of evolving standards of decency, the
plurality first examined the practices of the states. 94 The plurality
pointed to the fact that of the eighteen states that had expressly
considered the question of a minimum age for imposition of the
death penalty, all eighteen passed statutes requiring that the
83.
84.
85.
86.

487 U.S. 815 (1988).
492 U.S. 361 (1989).
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 861.
Id. at 862.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 815.
Id.

494
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defendant must have at least attained the age of sixteen at the time of
the capital offense. 95 Additionally, at the time of the ruling, thirteen
states and the District of Columbia had completely outlawed the
death penalty.
In contrast, nineteen other states allowed capital punishment and
did not have a minimum age for the death penalty 96 (but two out of
the nineteen had not imposed the death penalty since Furman).97 As
a practical matter, since they had not executed anyone in recent
history, those two states should be counted among the states that
would not execute a minor. Therefore, only seventeen out of fiftyone jurisdictions 98 would possibly impose the death penalty on a
defendant who had committed a crime under the age of sixteen.
However, because a state that failed to set a minimum age could
theoretically permit the imposition of the death penalty on children
as young as ten years old, the plurality argued that the approach of
the nineteen states that allowed capital punishment without reference
to a minimum age for its imposition were irrelevant for the purposes
states opposed the juvenile death penalty.
of calculating how many
99
explained:
plurality
The
We think it self-evident that such an argument is
unacceptable .... If, therefore, we accept the premise that
some offenders are simply too young to be put to death, it is
reasonable to put this group of statutes to one side because
they do not focus on the question of where the
chronological age line should be drawn.' 00
Therefore, the plurality found that only the eighteen states that
had set a minimum age limit for the death penalty were relevant
for the purposes of an "evolving standards of decency"
analysis.' 0 '

The plurality also found that all states had laws which
essentially drew lines between children and adults, thus
95. Id. at 829.
96. See id. at 826-27 n.25.
97. Those two states are South Dakota and Vermont. Id. at
829 n.29.
98. 50 states plus the District of Columbia.
99. See Federle, supra note 42, at 467-68.
100. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 828-29.
101. See id.
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demonstrating that the states recognize that children and adults
warrant different treatment in the eyes of the law. 10 2 For example, in
no state could a fifteen year-old vote or serve on a jury. 10 3 In all but
one state, a fifteen year-old could not drive with out the consent of an
adult, and in all but four states, a fifteen year-old could not marry
without parental consent. 1 4 The Justices reasoned that "[a]IU of this
legislation is consistent with the experience of mankind, as well as
the long history of our law, that the normal 15-year-old
is not
10 5
prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult."'
In addition, the plurality noted that executing children under the
age of sixteen would offend civilized standards of decency. 10 6 This
conclusion was consistent with the views of several respected
professional organizations and Western European nations including:
the American Bar Association, the American Law Institute, (former)
West Germany, France,
Portugal, the Netherlands, New Zealand and
07
Kingdom.1
the United
Finally, the plurality considered whether capital punishment as
applied to juveniles under the age of sixteen would serve to further
the "principal social purposes" of the death penalty-retribution and
deterrence.10 8 The Court concluded that executing such young
offenders would further neither purpose. 1 9 According to the
plurality, juveniles are less culpable than adults, and "[g]iven... the
teenager's capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to
its children," the theory of retribution "is simply inapplicable to the
execution of a 15-year-old. 11 Moreover, the plurality recognized
that teenagers are less likely to make a cost-benefit analysis before
acting. Finally, given the fact that very few children under the age of

102. Id. at 824.
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id. at 824-25.
106. See id. at 830.
107. See id. at 830-31.

108. Id. at 836.
109. See id. at 836-37.
110. Id. Moreover, the plurality argued "[t]he likelihood that the teenage
offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to
the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent." Id. at

837.
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fifteen are executed, the death penalty has a minimal deterrent effect
on this class of criminals."'
2. O'Connor's tie breaking concurrence
Although she believed that a "national consensus forbidding the
execution of any person for a crime committed before the age 16
very likely does exist," Justice O'Connor declined to join the
plurality because she did not believe the available evidence was
' 12
sufficient to make a "conclusion as a matter of constitutional law.""
Rather she believed that Thompson's death sentence should be set
aside on narrower grounds.' 1 3 O'Connor's main motivation for
reversing the defendant's sentence derived from the statute's
deficiency-since the statute was not age-specific, it did not
adequately address the important mitigating factor of the defendant's
age. 14 O'Connor explained that, with non-specific death penalty
statutes, there was a significant risk that state legislatures had not
thoroughly considered the possibility of execution when proscribing
the waiver of juveniles into the adult criminal system."15
The net effect of Thompson was to exempt offenders under the
age of sixteen from the death penalty. However, one year later in
1989, the Stanford court refused to extend death penalty protection to
juveniles between the ages of sixteen and seventeen.
B. Stanfordv. Kentucky
Stanford was a consolidation of two cases:
Stanford v.
16
17
Kentucky' and Wilkins v. Missouri.
In early January 1981,
seventeen year-old Kevin Stanford and an accomplice robbed a gas
station stealing 300 cartons of cigarettes, two gallons of fuel, and a
small amount of cash." 8 During the commission of the robbery, the
two robbers repeatedly raped and sodomized twenty year-old Barbel
Poore, the attendant. 19 Stanford and his accomplice then drove her
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id.
Id. at 848-49.
Id. at 849.
See id. at 857-58.
Id. at 857; See Federle, supra note 42, at 469.
492 U.S. 361, 361 (1989).
Id. at361.
Id.
at 365.
Id.
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to a secluded area where Stanford shot the victim two times--once in
the face, and once in the back of the head. 120 At trial a corrections
officer testified, offering an explanation of why Stanford murdered
the young woman, "'[H]e said, I had to shoot her, [she] lived next
,,,2 The facts of the
door to me and she would recognize me ....
companion case were just as brutal, except this time the defendant
22
was only sixteen years old when he viciously murdered his victim.
1. The Stanford plurality
Again, the Court was splintered, but this time the four Justices
that dissented in Thompson (Justices Scalia, White, Kennedy and
Chief Justice Rehnquist) announced the plurality decision. 23 The
four Justices that voted to outlaw executing fifteen year-olds
24
(Justices Brennan, Stevens, Blackmun, and Marshall) dissented.
25
O'Connor, acting yet again as the tie breaker, concurred. 1
The plurality once again looked to evolving standards of
decency, but this time only whether the state allowed or forbade the
juvenile death penalty was factored into their "prevailing standard of
decency" analysis. The Court did not consider the states' legislative

120. Id.

121. Id.
122. Here, Heath Wilkins planned to rob a convenience store and murder
"'whoever was behind the counter' because "'a dead person can't talk."' Id.
at 366. Wilkins' accomplice held down twenty-nine year-old Nancy Allen
while Wilkins stabbed her. Id. When the accomplice had trouble opening the
cash register, Allen spoke up to assist him. Id. Wilkins responded by stabbing
her three times in the chest. Id. When the victim begged for her life, Wilkins
stabbed her four more times in the neck. Id. The two left her on the floor to
die making off with approximately $450 dollars and some liquor and
cigarettes. Id.
123. Id. at 364.
124. Id. at 392.
125. O'Connor agreed with the plurality that death sentences of Stanford and
Wilkins "should not be set aside because it is sufficiently clear that no national
consensus forbids the imposition of capital punishment on 16- or 17-year-old
capital murderers." Id. at 381. (O'Connor, J. concurring). However, she
urged that when addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied
to a particular class, the Court has a "constitutional obligation to conduct
proportionality analysis." Id. at 382. In other words, O'Connor endorsed an
approach in which the Court assessed legislative actions of the state and judged
whether the "nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's
blameworthiness' is proportional." Id.
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treatment of juveniles in other respects. 126 As a result, the plurality
ultimately concluded that defendants had failed to prove that a
national consensus existed in opposition to the juvenile death
penalty. 127 In direct contrast to the reasoning of Thompson, the
plurality in this case reasoned that state laws which set the legal age
at eighteen and above for adult activities such as voting, driving and
drinking alcoholic beverages are irrelevant. 128 The Court explained,
"It is... absurd to think that one must be mature enough to drive
carefully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be
mature enough to understand that murdering another human being is
profoundly wrong."' 12 9 Moreover, the plurality reasoned that these
statutes are irrelevant because they operate in gross, for efficiency
reasons, and do not "conduct individualized maturity tests for each
driver, drinker, or voter.' 30 The criminal justice system, on the
other hand, does address the age and maturity level of offenders
individually, "[i]n the realm of capital punishment in particular,
131
'individualized consideration [is] a constitutional requirement."
The plurality supported this contention by citing to twenty-nine
states (including Kentucky and Missouri) that have laws that
specifically designate age as a mitigating factor in capital cases.132
The plurality also rejected the argument that various
professional legal associations, public interest groups, and public
opinion should be considered when determining a consensus. 33 In
addition, the plurality declared that sentencing practices of foreign
countries were completely irrelevant, emphasizing that in Eighth
Amendment analysis "it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive."1 34 Finally, the plurality refused to entertain arguments
addressing the "goals of penology" and the efficacy of the death
penalty in meeting those goals. 135 According to the plurality:

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id. at 370-73.
See id.
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 375 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
Id.
See id. at 377.
Id. at 369 n.1.
Id. at 377.
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The audience for these arguments... is not this Court but
the citizenry of the United States. It is they, not we, who
must be persuaded .... [O]ur job is to identify the
"evolving standards of decency"; to determine, not what
1
they should be, but what they are. 36
a. playing with numbers: evolving standardsof decency as
evidenced by the decisions of the states' legislatures
According to the plurality, the most definitive indicator of
evolving standards of decency are the laws passed by state
legislatures. 137 The plurality noted that out of the thirty-seven states
(as of 1989 when this case was decided) whose laws permitted
capital punishment, twelve declined to impose it on minors. 138 The
plurality declared "[t]his does not establish the degree of national
consensus this Court has previously thought
sufficient to label a
139
particular punishment cruel and unusual.'
Upon closer inspection, it appears that the plurality may have
skewed its calculations to achieve a desired result. When addressing
whether a consensus existed, the plurality did not include those states
which had already abolished the death penalty. 140 It is illogical not
to include these states into the calculus. As Amnesty International
posits:
[A] state which does not allow the execution of anyone,
juvenile or adult, has by definition taken a stronger stand
against the death penalty than by only exempting youthful
offenders from it .... [I]n the event of a decision to
reinstate the death penalty,
such a state would exempt
14 1
children from its scope.
Thus, in actuality, there was a fifty-fifty split among the states.
When Stanford was decided twenty-five states still imposed the

136. Id. at 378.
137. Id. at 370.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 370-71.

141. United States of America, Indecent and Internationally Illegal. The
Death Penalty Against Child Offenders, Abridged Version, AMNESTY INT'L,
Sept. 25, 2002, at 5 [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL].
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death penalty on offenders under the age of eighteen. 142 Of the death
penalty states, twelve refused to impose it against juveniles and
thirteen states had completely outlawed capital punishment-in other
words, twenty-five states had completely eradicated the juvenile
death penalty. 143 Only three states allowed the execution of sixteen
year-olds. The dissent saw this manipulation and argued that the
plurality's "discussion of state laws concerning capital sentencing
...gives a distorted view of the evidence of contemporary standards
that these legislative determinations provide."' 144 The dissent
advocated including the District of Columbia in the calculus, and
argued that those states that had completely outlawed the death
penalty should be counted. 145 The balance tips further if the federal
death penalty (which does not allow the execution of minors) is also
counted. 146 With this approach, a consensus becomes clear-twentyfive jurisdictions willing to impose the death penalty on juvenile
offenders compared with twenty-seven jurisdictions that would not
do so.
C. Penry v. Lynaugh
Numerous parallels exist between the Court's analysis in Penry
and Stanford. The Court has since rejected the reasoning of Penry,
overruling its holding with the recent Atkins opinion. 147 A logical
extension of this reasoning would be for the Court to also reject the
reasoning of Stanford, and thus find the execution of minors
unconstitutional.
1. The death penalty and mentally retarded offenders
On the same day that the Court decided Stanford, it also
concluded that there was insufficient evidence of a national
consensus against executing mentally retarded people
to establish
148
that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits it.
142. See Stanford,492 U.S. at 370.
143. Id. at 384. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-21 (2002).
148. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Here the majority consisted of
O'Connor, Scalia, White, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.).

Fall 2003]

THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY

In October of 1979, twenty-two year-old Paul Penry raped, beat
and then stabbed Pamela Carpenter with a pair of scissors. 149 Before
standing trial for the murder of Carpenter, Penry underwent a
competency hearing. 150 A clinical psychologist testified that Penry
had a mental age of a six-and-a-half year-old.151 Nevertheless, a jury
determined that he was competent to stand trial. 152 In other words,
the jury found that Penry had "the ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding," and that he had
"a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings .... "'" The jury also rejected Penry's insanity defense
and by doing so, it concluded "that Penry knew that his conduct was
wrong and was capable of conforming his conduct to the
requirements of the law."' 154
The majority cited the common law prohibition against
punishing "idiots" for their crimes. 155 According to the majority, this
common law prohibition suggested that "it may indeed be 'cruel and
unusual' punishment to execute persons who are profoundly or
Nevertheless, the majority argued that,
severely retarded ....
because of the insanity defense, defendants with such extreme mental
deficiencies will most likely not have to face conviction or
punishment. 157 This is because those defendants will either be found
incompetent to stand trial or will be found not guilty by reason of
insanity or mental disease or defect. Here, though, Penry had been
competent to stand trial and sane at the time of his
found both
58
crime.'
The Penry Court reiterated that the "clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values [of evolving standards of
149. Id. at 307.
150. Id.
151. In other words, Penry had "the ability to learn and the learning or the
knowledge of an average 62 year old." Id. at 308.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 333.
154. Id.
155. Although there was no one definition of idiocy at common law, the
Court noted that the term "idiot" was generally used in reference to people
"who had a total lack of reason or understanding, or an inability to distinguish
between good and evil." Id. at 331-32.
156. Id. at 333.
157. See id.
158. Id.
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' 59
decency] is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."'
At the time Penry was decided, only two states had enacted statutes
Not
banning the execution of mentally retarded persons."'
surprisingly, the Court held that "two state statutes prohibiting
execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to the fourteen
States that have rejected capital punishment completely, do not
provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus.''
In addition, the Court reasoned (as they did in Stanford) that
public opinion surveys expressing opposition to the execution of
mentally retarded criminals, as well as opposition by respected
professional groups, were not sufficient to establish a national
consensus.1 62 The Court took the stance that although such data may
reflect a growing sentiment, it would not be considered by the Court
because the only objective indicator of contemporary values is state
legislation. 163 The Court, however, indicated that it would be willing
to consider the behavior ofjuries in its calculus of evolving standards
of decency.' 64 Nevertheless, because 65Penry did not offer such
evidence, this factor went unconsidered. 1
As in Stanford, the majority also rejected arguments dealing
with penological goals. 166 Both Penry and various amici argued that
"all mentally retarded people regardless of their degree of
retardation, have substantial cognitive and behavioral disabilities that
167
reduce their level of blameworthiness for a capital offense."'
Therefore, they claimed that execution of mentally retarded people
would serve "no valid retributive purpose.' 68 The Court was
unwilling to conclude that "all mentally retarded people...

159. Id. at 331.
160. Those two states are Maryland and Georgia. Id. at 334.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 334-35.
163. "The public sentiment expressed in these and other polls and resolutions
may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of
contemporary values upon which we can rely." Id. at 335.
164. The majority stated that "[iun discerning those 'evolving standards'...
[w]e have also looked to data concerning the actions of sentencing juries." Id.
at 331. However, note that the Stanford plurality virtually ignored this
evidence. See Stanford, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
165. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335-39.
166. See id. at 336-39.
167. Id. at 336.
168. Id. at 337.
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inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act
169
with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty.,
The Court acknowledged that the degree of disability varies among
mentally retarded persons. 170 However, the Court argued that giving
mentally retarded persons blanket immunity to the death penalty
could actually result in greater stigmatization, thereby setting a
precedent to limit their rights. 17 1 Moreover, the majority reiterated
that both competency hearings and the insanity defense would act as
safe-guards to ensure that retribution and deterrence would
be
72
1
criminals.
retarded
mentally
functioning
effective for higher
III. ATKJNS v. VIRGINIA AND ITS APPLICATION TO JUVENILES

In June 2002, the Supreme Court re-addressed the
constitutionality of executing mentally retarded offenders. 173 Citing
Penry, the Court focused on the activities of state legislatures to
determine whether a consensus existed against executing the
mentally retarded. 174 Since Penry was handed down, sixteen states
have passed legislation prohibiting such executions. 75 As a result, a
total of eighteen death penalty states prohibited the execution of
mentally retarded offenders. Adding that figure to the twelve states
that prohibit the death penalty entirely, the resulting ratio of thirty to
twenty emerges: thirty states would not permit the execution of a
mentally retarded defendant, while twenty states would.
Nevertheless, the Court stated that it was "not so much the
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the
direction of change.' 76 In other words, the Court found the
combination of the "large number of States prohibiting the execution
169. Id. at 338.
170. Id. The Court used the report of an amicus group to support its
contention. The American Association of Mentally Retarded (AAMR)
provided evidence that although mentally retarded individuals "'share the
common attributes of low intelligence and inadequacies in adaptive behavior
there are marked variations in the degree of deficit ...

."' Id.

171. See id. at 340. For example, mentally retarded people as a class could
be denied the right to marry or enter contracts.
172. See id. at 337-38.
173. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
174. Id. at 312.
175. Id. at 314-15. The court also noted that at least three other states have
had similar legislation pass through at least one house. Id. at 315.
176. Id. at 315.
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of mentally retarded persons" and the "complete absence of States
passing legislation" to reinstate such executions was compelling
evidence that "today our society views mentally retarded offenders
177
as categorically less culpable than the average criminal."'
Furthermore, the Court noted that "even in those States that allow the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, the practice is
uncommon."' 178 Thus, the Court concluded the execution of mentally
retarded offenders "has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say
179
that a national consensus has developed against it."
The Court then added a footnote addressing where this left
juvenile executions. The Court wrote:
A comparison of Stanford v. Kentucky, in which we held
that there was no national consensus prohibiting the
execution of juvenile offenders over age 15, is telling.
Although we decided Stanford on the same day as Penry,
apparently only two state legislatures have raised the
threshold age for imposition of the death penalty.18 o
A. A CurrentConsensus Against Juvenile Executions
Although the trend against banning juvenile executions is less
1 81
recent and pronounced, this does not mean that it does not exist.
In the thirteen years since the 1989 Stanford and Penry rulings, fewer
states have banned juvenile executions than those who have enacted
legislation banning the execution of mentally retarded. 182 This result
however, can be explained by realizing that "the states had farther to
' 83
go in outlawing the execution of the mentally retarded."'
Moreover, the "direction" of change against banning juvenile
184
executions remains constant.
It is also arguable that there is legislative consensus against
juvenile executions. By including those states that completely
177. Id. at 315-16.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 315 n.18.
181. Appellant's Petition for Certiorari at 7, Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984
(2002) cert. denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2002) (No. 02-6010).
[hereinafter Patterson Brief].
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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prohibit the death penalty in the count, the following ratio results:
twenty-eight to twenty-two. In other words, twenty eight states will
not execute offenders under the age of eighteen, while twenty-two
states still allow the execution of minors. Thus, 56% of the states
will not execute minors. This development, however, is not as
dramatic as the change in the states' attitudes towards the execution
of mentally retarded defendants. Nevertheless, as the Atkins Court
discussed, it was the "consistency
of the direction" of change, which
185
compelling.
be
to
found
they
This "consistency and direction" is more dramatically
demonstrated when looking at how state courts have actually
imposed the death penalty on juveniles than by examining the formal
actions of the legislature. In the modem death penalty era (i.e. since
Furman) only twenty-two people have been executed for crimes that
they committed as juveniles. 186 This constitutes a mere 2.6% of the
total of approximately 800 executions that have occurred in the
United States in that time period. 187 Of those twenty-two people
executed, only one of the defendants was sixteen when he committed
murder-Sean Sellers.' 88 In fact, the execution of Sean Sellers was
the first time in forty years that a defendant has been
executed for a
189
seventeen.
of
age
the
under
while
committed
crime
Furthermore, since Stanford, seventeen of the twenty-two
juvenile death penalty states have sentenced a person to death for19a0
crime that was committed while under the age of eighteen.
However, two of those seventeen states reversed those sentences and
185. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
186. Strieb Web Report supra note 69. Eighteen of those executions have
occurred since the 1989 rulings of Stanford and Penry. Adam Liptak, 3
Justices Callfor Reviewing Death Sentences for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.

30, 2002, at Al. But note that of those states that authorized the execution of
the mentally retarded, only five offenders were executed in the years between
Penry and Atkins. See id.
187. Strieb Web Report, supra note 69.
188. Id.
189. Juveniles Executed in the US. Since 1976, Death Penalty Info Center,
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=27&did=206
(last visited
Sept. 28, 2003). Sean Sellers was executed in Oklahoma on February 4, 1999.
Id. The last sixteen year old offender executed was Leonard Shockley who
died in Maryland's gas chamber in 1959. Id. Although the companion case to
Stanford involved the execution of a defendant who committed a crime at the
age of sixteen, he has not been executed. See id.
190. See Strieb Web Report, supra note 69.
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have not imposed a juvenile death penalty since, leaving only fifteen
19 1
states that actively impose the death penalty on juvenile offenders.
Moreover, since Stanford, only six states have actually executed a
juvenile offender. 192 In addition, it seems that juries are less inclined
to impose death sentences. Fourteen minors were given a death
sentence in 1999, seven in 2001, four in 2002 and only two juveniles
were given a death penalty sentence in 2003.193 This lack of
frequency is telling.
Current public opinion also demonstrates that the majority of
American citizens are against the execution of juveniles. A recent
CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll found that although 64% of Americans
support the death penalty in general, 69% of Americans oppose the
application of the death penalty to juvenile offenders. 194
THE CURRENT CONSENSUS:
STATES

DEATH PENALTY AS APPLIED TO JUVENILE OFFENDERS
THAT DO NOT EXECUTE STATES
THAT Do
EXEcuTE

JUVENILE OFFENDERS

JUVENILE OFFENDERS

STATES WITH 18
AS THE MINIMUM

16 (17 including
Federal

STATES WITH 16
AS THE MINIMUM 17

AGE FOR DEATH
PENALTY
ELIGIBILITY:

Jurisdiction)

AGE FOR DEATH
PENALTY
ELIGIBILITY:

STATES WITHOUT
DEATH PENALTY:

12 (13 including STATES WITH 17
the District of AS THE MINIMUM 5
Columbia)
AGE FOR DEATH
PENALTY
ELIGIBILITY:

TOTAL: 19

TOTAL:' 9 6

28 (30 including
D.C.
Juris.)

and

Fed.

22
I

I

191. Id. Washington and Kentucky imposed death sentences on juvenile
offenders but the state supreme courts have reversed each sentence. Id.
192. See id. The six states are Texas, Louisiana, Missouri, Georgia,
Virginia, and Oklahoma.
193 Mearssupra note 18.
194. Bill Mears, Supreme Court Not Ready to Debate Execution ofJuveniles,
CNN, Jan. 29, 2003 at http:// www.cnn.com/2003ALAW/01/29/
scotus.deathpenalty/ index.html.
195. The following states have outlawed the death penalty as applied to
juveniles: 1) California, 2) Colorado, 3) Connecticut, 4) Illinois, 5) Indiana,
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DEATH PENALTY AS APPLIED TO MENTALLY RETARDED
OFFENDERS
THAT
DID
EXECUTE
STATES THAT DID NOT EXECUTE STATES
MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDERS
MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDERS
STATES
THAT 18 (19 including STATES THAT DID 20
EXECUTE
DID NOT APPLY Federal
MENTALLY
DEATH
Jurisdiction)
TO
RETARDED
PENALTY
OFFENDERS:
MENTALLY
RETARDED
OFFENDERS:
STATES
WITHOUT
DEATH
PENALTY:
TOTAL:

12 (13 including
District
of
Columbia)
30 (32 including
D.C. and Fed. TOTAL: 198
Juris.)
II_

20

6)Kansas, 7) Maryland, 8) Montana, 9) Nebraska, 10)New Jersey, 11) New
Mexico, 12) New York, 13) Ohio, 14) Oregon, 15) Tennessee, and 16)
Washington. Streib Web Report, supra note 69. Under Federal jurisdiction,
juveniles cannot be executed. Twelve states have completely outlawed the
death penalty: 1) Alaska 2) Hawaii 3) Iowa 4) Maine 5) Massachusetts, 6)
Michigan, 7) Minnesota, 8) North Dakota, 9) Rhode Island, 10) Vermont, 11)
West Virginia, and 12) Wisconsin. Id. The District of Columbia has also
outlawed the death penalty for all age groups. Id.
196. The following states have age sixteen as the minimum age for death
penalty eligibility: 1) Alabama, 2) Arizona, 3) Arkansas, 4) Delaware, 5)
Idaho, 6) Kentucky, 7) Louisiana, 8) Mississippi, 9) Missouri, 10) Nevada, 11)
Oklahoma, 12) Pennsylvania, 13) South Carolina, 14) South Dakota, 15) Utah,
16)Virginia, and 17) Wyoming. Id. Five states have age seventeen as the
minimum age for death penalty eligibility: 1) Florida, 2) Georgia, 3) New
Hampshire, 4) North Carolina, 5) Texas. Id.
197. The following states have outlawed the death penalty as applied to
mentally retarded offenders: 1) Arizona, 2) Arkansas, 3) Colorado,
4) Connecticut, 5) Florida, 6) Georgia, 7) Indiana, 8) Kansas, 9) Kentucky,
10) Maryland, 11) Missouri, 12) Nebraska, 13) New Mexico, 14) New York,
15) North Carolina, 16) South Dakota, 17) Tennessee, and 18) Washington.
198. The following states did execute mentally retarded offenders:
1)Alabama, 2) California, 3) Delaware, 4) Idaho, 5) Illinois, 6) Louisiana,
7) Mississippi, 8) Montana, 9) Nevada, 10) New Hampshire, 11) New Jersey,

I
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B. AdditionalAtkins Factorsand Their Application to Juveniles
In stark contrast with its approach in Penry, the Court in Atkins
reflected on the approaches of other nations and professional
organizations. 199 In one footnote, the Court considered that several
organizations had adopted official positions opposing the execution
of the mentally retarded. 20 0 The Court also found the practice and
attitudes of other nations to be persuasive, writing that "within the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
committed by
20 1
disapproved.,

1. A world consensus
Many of the same organizations cited by the Atkins majority
(and other similar organizations) have also spoken out against the
juvenile death penalty, including: the American Bar Association, the
National Parents and Teachers Association, the American Society for
Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Psychiatric Association, the
National Mental Health Association, the American Baptist Church,
the American Jewish Congress, General Assembly of the
Christian Leadership, and the United
Presbyterian Church, Southern
202
States Catholic Conference.
Moreover, the United States' continued protection of juvenile
executions is "increasingly out of step with international standards of
Since 1990,
decency and established international law." 20 3
approximately 56% of the world's known juvenile executions have
taken place in the United States. 204 The others took place in the
12) Ohio, 13) Oklahoma, 14) Oregon, 15) Pennsylvania, 16) South Carolina,
17) Texas, 18) Utah, 19) Virginia, 20) Wyoming.

199. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.

200. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). The APA, the
AAMR and in addition, representatives of widely diverse religious
communities also spoke out against the death penalty as applied to this class.
201. Id. at317n.21.
202. See generally, Brief for Appellant at 38-41, Missouri v. Simmons,(Mo.
2002) (No. SC84454) [hereinafter Simmons Brief] (citing amicus briefs
submitted on behalf of Kevin Stanford and other recent groups that have
spoken out).
203. Drizin and Harper, supranote 76.
204. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 131, at 25.
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Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and Yemen.20 5 Both Yemen and Pakistan have since
abolished the death penalty, and the Democratic 2Republic
of Congo
06
has instated a moratorium on juvenile executions.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children
(Article 37(a)) provides that "[n]either capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for
offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age. 20 7 The
United States is the only country that has failed to ratify this
agreement, "in large part because of our [the United States'] desire to
remain free to retain the death penalty for juvenile offenders. 2 °8
C. Culpability,Penology, and Lack of ProceduralProtection

The Atkins Court also discussed three other factors that serve to
justify the prohibition against executing mentally retarded offenders:
The culpability of mentally retarded offenders, the penological utility
of executing mentally retarded offenders, and the lack of procedural
protections where a mentally retarded defendant faces the death
penalty. 0 9
1. Diminished culpability of mentally retarded and juveniles
The Atkins Court reasoned, that although many mentally
retarded individuals are capable of distinguishing between right and
wrong and are competent to stand trial, this does not necessarily
mean that they are deserving of the ultimate punishment. "Because
of their impairments... they [the mentally retarded] have
diminished capacities to understand and process information.., to
abstract from mistakes... [to] learn from experience, to engage in
logical reasoning.., and to understand the reactions of others. 210
While the same is not necessarily true for juveniles, both classes
share a common deficiency, which the Atkins court also found to be
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Streib Web Report, supra note 69.
208. Id. This uniquely American practice is also in conflict with various
other international laws and treaties including: Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Geneva Conventions. See
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 141, at 25-27.
209. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317-21 (2002).
210. Id. at 318.

510
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21 1 Juveniles and the mentally retarded both lack impulse
persuasive.
212
control.
Within the past decade, neuroscientists have discovered that the
adolescent brain is far from mature, instead the "teenage brain is a
work in progress.', 213 One of the last parts of the brain to develop is
the prefrontal cortex.214 Known as the "supervisor of the brain," the
prefrontal cortex is what "separates man from beast," regulating
emotions and allowing us to make judicious decisions. 215 Evidence
is constantly emerging that brain development continues beyond the
age of eighteen.216 After studying brain scans, the National Institute
of Mental Health has found that there is a defined difference in the
frontal lobes of those between the ages of twelve to sixteen and
twenty-three to thirty. 217 This difference suggests that teenagers
have a slower maturation of cognitive processing and other
"executive" functions.218
This biological insight helps explain what we already know.
Teenagers behave with limited awareness of the consequences of
their actions. As the dissenters in Stanford wrote, "[M]inors are
treated differently from adults in our laws, which reflects the simple
truth derived from communal experience that juveniles as a class
have not the level of maturation and responsibility that we presume
in adults ... ,,219

211. See id.
212. See id.; see also Simmons Brief, supra note 202, at 4-8 (discussing an
adolescent's lack of brain development as a basis for poor impulse control and
decision making).
213. Shannon Brownlee, Inside the Teen Brain, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT,

Aug. 9, 1999, at 46.

214. See Simmons Brief, supra note 202, at 5.
215. See id. at 4-16.
216. United States of America: Indecent and Internationally Illegal, the
Death Penalty against Child Offenders, Abridged version, Sept. 25, 2002, at
14.
217. See also Patterson Brief, supra note 181, at 13-14 (quoting Dr. Ruben
C. Gur on his findings on the maturation of the adult brain versus the
adolescent brain).
218. See id.
219. In re Kevin Nigel Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting J. Brennan's dissent in the original Stanford). With all of
these arguments in mind, the question arises, why draw the line at eighteen?
The Stanford dissenters have addressed this issue:
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2. Penological utility
It is this lack of impulse control, and thus culpability that
renders the death penalty futile in terms of penological theory when
applied to either the mentally retarded or juvenile offenders.
According to Atkins, "[u]nless the imposition of the death penalty"
measurably serves a punitive or deterrent function, "'it is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment.' 220 The death
penalty can only act as a deterrent when murder is a result of
premeditation and calculation. 221 Therefore, its imposition could not
possibly accomplish any of the penological goals which might justify
such a severe punishment.
3. Lack of procedural protection
Not only did the Court recognize that the death penalty for the
mentally retarded lacked positive utilitarian value, but the Court also
acknowledged that its imposition carried inherent serious risks.222
The Court declared that "mentally retarded defendants in the
aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution." 223 This risk
derives from the possibility of coerced confessions, diminished
ability of mentally retarded defendants to assist in their own defense,

Insofar as age 18 is a necessarily arbitrary social choice as a point 'at
which to acknowledge a person's maturity and responsibility, given
the different developmental rates of individuals, it is in fact 'a
conservative estimate of the dividing line between adolescence and
adulthood....'
Id. at 971.
The answer is that we have to draw the line somewhere and "[eighteen] is the
dividing line that society has generally drawn, the point at which it is thought
reasonable to assume that persons have an ability to make... [and] bear
responsibility for their judgments." Id. Making eighteen the cut off age will

also resolve any inconsistencies in death penalty application caused by the
juvenile waiver system. Finally, eighteen is the cut off age dictated by the
United Nations. By elevating the cut off age, the United States will fall in line
with almost every other nation in the world. See supra text accompanying
footnotes 203-08.
220. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
221. See id.
222. See id. at 321.
223. Id.
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and the difficulties they face making a persuasive showing of
mitigating factors.224
Several of these risks apply equally to juvenile offenders. First,
like people with mental retardation, juvenile offenders may be more
vulnerable to making false confessions than a more experienced
adult.225 Second, at the trial stage, rather than acting as a mitigating
factor, the youthfulness of an offender may in fact become a "double
edged sword that may increase the likelihood that the jury will view
the defendant as a dangerous individual .... 226 Finally, a youthful
offender will be hard pressed to demonstrate background generally
presented in criminal sentencing as "typical" mitigation evidence
(i.e. a positive work history, being a supportive parent, or having
meaningful relationships with friends and family) simply because
they have not lived long enough to develop this history.227
Therefore, as with the mentally retarded, there is a significant risk of
wrongful execution of juvenile offenders.
In addition, the procedures that allow juvenile offenders to be
waived out of juvenile court and tried as adults leave room for
inconsistencies in the application of the juvenile death penalty.
Judges have significant discretion when it comes to deciding whether
to waive a juvenile into adult court. 22 8 This level of discretion
creates a risk of masking discrimination of minority offenders. 229 In
addition, many times the decision to transfer a minor may be based
on bureaucratic reasons, rather than on an individual determination

224. Id. at 320-21.
225. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 141, at 17. Without a lawyer
present, seventeen year-old Toronto Patterson gave police a statement where
he implicated himself but did not admit to murdering the victims. Id. at 22.
The police then aggressively interrogated him. Patterson asked for a lawyer
and for the interrogation to be recorded. The police did not oblige him. After
four hours of being incommunicado he confessed to the murders. Id. A month
later, another suspect confessed to the same crime after the same police
officers employed similar tactics. That suspect's confession was later deemed
false and he was exonerated. The jury in Patterson's case was not allowed to
hear the evidence of this other suspect's confession. Patterson maintained his
innocence until he was executed on August 28, 2002. Id.
226. Id. at 19.
227. See Simmons Brief, supranote 202, at 23.
228. See Federle, supra note 42, at 448.
229. See generally id. (addressing the inherent flaws of the current juvenile
waiver system and the implications on the application of the death penalty).
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230 In short, there are no guarantees that only the
of blameworthiness. 23
most culpable minors will be tried as adults.231
Thus, the
youthfulness of an offender may often act as an aggravator during
the penalty stage of prosecution. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly glossed over the issue of the juvenile waiver232system
when addressing the legitimacy of the juvenile death penalty.

D. Necessity of a Legislative Consensus
In conformity with its earlier opinions, the Atkins Court stated
that the additional factors considered "are by no means
dispositive.. . ." The Court further explained, however, that their
"consistency with the legislative evidence lends further support to
our conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have
addressed the issue. 233 In other words, it seems that the Court will
only consider these factors (opinions of professional groups, the
approach of foreign nations, degree of culpability, penological
utility, and lack of procedural protection) as persuasive after a
legislative consensus has been established. Yet one question
remains-what will it take for the Court to finally recognize that a
consensus exists? The Court has declined to find one thus far. Half
of the states had already prohibited the execution of juveniles when
Stanford was decided, yet this was not sufficient.234 Although the
movement against the juvenile death penalty is not as dramatic as the
movement against the execution of the mentally retarded, the
direction and consistency of the change is the same.

230. See id.

231. A development of this theory could pave the way for a Furman type
argument. Conceivably, if the Court accepts that the juvenile death penalty is

applied inconsistently, i.e., in an "arbitrary and capricious manner," Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1962), it could be suspended. The hope would be that
during this suspension a number of the remaining death penalty states would
change their approaches and eventually ban the execution of minors. This, of
course, would lead the Court to determine that a consensus has developed.
Thus, it would allow the Court to make the next move in step with its Atkins
decision-declaring executions of minors to be unconstitutional.
232. Federle, supra note 42, at 452. In fact, the Supreme Court has not
examined the constitutionality of the waiver system since the 1966 decision in
Kent v. United States. Id.
233. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43..
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V. CONCLUSION

Thus, despite any arguments that establish that juveniles are in
an analogous position to that of the mentally retarded, it is clear from
the Supreme Court's stance that, as a practical matter, the key to
destroying the juvenile death penalty lies with state legislatures.
Once a national "consensus is established" the rest will fall into
place.
The legitimacy of this approach, however, is questionable
because it "return[s] the task of defining the contours of Eighth
Amendment protection to political majorities., 235 The purpose of the
Bill of Rights was to remove certain fundamental rights from the
reach of the political process and elevate them to the highest level of
protection. 236 "The promise of the Bill of Rights goes unfulfilled
when we leave '[c]onstitutional doctrine [to] be formulated by the
acts of those institutions which the Constitution is supposed to
,, ,237
limit.
It is ironic that only after a consensus is established by the states
will the Court look closely at what should be the focal point of the
Eighth Amendment analysis--culpability and penological utility.
The Court, however, has clearly indicated that it will not consider
these factors until after the states have taken their positions. By
using this approach, the Court has limited its authoritycircumventing its inherent power to elevate its definition of what is
truly cruel and unusual above the definition given by a consensus of
the states.
Sharon Ongerth*
235. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 391 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
236. See id. (citing W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943) ("[T]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities .... One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental

rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.").

237. Id. at 392.
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